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ABSTRACT 
The paper considers economies involving one public good, one private good, and constant 
returns to scale. It is shown that the process proposed earlier in Chander (1983, 1987a, and 1987b) 
always converges to an allocation which is in the core of the economy. This is then interpreted as an 
incentive property of the process and it is shown that there exists no process which always converges 
to the core and in which truthtelling constitutes a dominance equilibrium of the 'local incentive 
game'. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
INCENTIVES AND A PROCESS CONVERGING 
TO THE 
CORE OF A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY 
Parkash Chander*
A major concern of economic theory is the problem of choosing from among the set of all 
feasible alternatives those which are acceptable in some sense to every agent or every subset of 
agents. An often used tool of analysis in this regard is the theory of n -person cooperative games and
the associated solution concept of a core. Though the path breaking work of H. Scarf established 
sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the core of an economy independently of the 
descriptive concept of a competitive equilibrium, the dynamic approaches to the core continue to be 
confined to only the competitive process that under certain conditions can be shown to converge to 
some particular allocations in the core. This is perhaps because the core as a solution concept 
involves the unrealistic assumption of complete infonnation. Whereas the competitive process 
allows privacy or dispersion of infonnation. 
The case of economies with public goods, however, appears to be even more difficult 
because the competitive process can no longer be shown to lead to an efficient solution and there is 
no other informationally decentralized process available that converges to the core. The 
informational and computational requirements of achieving core allocations in economies with 
public goods therefore seem to be far beyond any accessibility. 
Chander (1983, 1987a, and 1987b) propose a dynamic process for economies involving one 
public and one private good and constant returns to scale which exhibits a continuous path of 
feasible reallocations of commodities that converges from the initial endowments to an individually 
rational and Pareto optimal allocation. The process is infonnationally decentralized in the sense that 
only local information concerning the marginal rates of substitution of the agents is required. The 
process is also unbiased in the sense that any Pareto optimal allocation can be realized by a suitable 
redistribution of the initial endowments. 
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The present paper shows that the process in fact always converges from the initial 
endowments to some allocation in the core, i. e. , to a subset of Pareto optimal and individually 
rational allocations. 1
Apart from its theoretical interest as outlined above, the convergence property is of 
considerable interest from the point of view of the problem of incentives as well. 
Hurwicz ( 1972) , Ledyard and Roberts ( 1974 ) ,  and Roberts ( 1979) prove an impossibility 
result that their exists no ( static) mechanism whose outcomes are always Pareto optimal and in 
which truthtelling is a dominance strategy. Groves and Ledyard ( 1977) , Hurwicz ( 1979) and Walker 
( 1981) among others therefore design mechanisms by sacrificing dominance equilibria requirement 
and accept weaker type namely the noncooperative Nash equilibria. 
On the other hand Fugigaki and Sato ( 1981) and Laffont and Maskin ( 1983) describe a class 
of dynamic processes which have the remarkable property that truthtelling constitutes a dominance 
equilibrium of the local incentive game ( see Dreze and de la vallee Poussin ( 1971) , Malinvaud 
( 1971) and Roberts ( 1979) ) and which converge to individually rational and Pareto optimal 
allocations. Chander ( 1987b) shows that truthtelling is not a dominance strategy of the local 
incentive game corresponding to his process, though unique Nash equilibrium strategies exist and if 
the agents adopt their Nash strategies then the so-defined 'Nash strategically stable' process, as seen 
below, also converges to the core. 
This leads to the question whether there exists a process which converges to the core and in 
which truthtelling is a dominance strategy of the local incentive game. We show below that there 
exists no such process. This means there are limits to what can be achieved in terms of the various 
desirable properties of dynamic processes as well. 
In terms of the existing literature on dynamic processes for public good economies, the 
present result may be described as follows. In their path breaking work Dreze and de la Vallee 
Poussin ( 1971) and Malinvaud ( 1970 and 1971) describe a process which always converges from the 
initial endowments to an individually rational and Pareto optimal allocation. Their process which 
has come to be termed the MDP process, has been at the centre of all later work on dynamic 
processes for public good economies during the last fifteen years or so. Chander ( 1987a and 1987b) 
give several theoretical justifications for his process in comparison with the MDP process, though as 
noted there the two processes are similar in nature. The results of this paper should therefore 
strengthen those justifications further. 
We pre sent both a mathematical as well as an intuitive geometrical proof of the main results. 
For the geometrical proofs we extend the Kolm triangle diagram beyond what has been done in the 
literature so far. The extension in itself is of some independent interest. 
The contents of this paper are as follows: section 2 introduces the model and definitions. 
Section 3 proves the convergence result. Section 4 proves the impossibility result that there exists 
no process which always converges to the core and in which truthtelling is a dominance strategy of 
the local incentive game. 
1. As a matter of fact this was conjectured already in Chander (1987 a, footnote 8), but no proof was offered.
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IL THE MODEL AND DEFINITIONS 
We consider economies consisting of one public good, whose quantity is denoted by x, one 
private good, whose quantity is denoted by y , n consumers, and a single producer. Each consumer 
is characterized by his utility function u i defined on R J ( the nonnegative orthant of R 2) and by a 
positive endowment wi of the private good. The producer is characterized by a cost function 
g : R i � R i which associates with every quantity of public good the minimum cost ( in terms of 
the private good) g (x) needed in order to produce quantity x of the public good. Let N = { 1, · · · ,n} 
denote the set of consumers. 
Assumption 1: For each i EN 
1.1 u i is quasi-concave and at least twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave 
for at least one i . 
1.2 
1.3 
au i (x ,y) I ax ;;:: 0 and au i (x ,y) I a y  > 0 for all (x ,y) ER]+ ( the positive orthant of R2) ;
-I' > 0 Ii au i (x ,y ) Jax - 0J.Or any x _ , m . 
y�O au 1 (X ,y ) Jay
Assumption (1.2) implies that the utility functions are monotonic in terms of the public good 
and strictly monotonic in terms of the private good. Assumption (1. 3) rules out the possibility of a 
consumer giving up every last bit of the private good. It is not essential for the analysis below, but is 
made only in order to avoid certain boundary problems that may arise otherwise. 
Assumption 2: The cost function g is linear, i. e. , g (x) = x. 
An allocation is an (n + 1) tuple (x ,y 1, · · · ,y n) ER i + 1 where (x ,y i) denotes the 
consumption bundle of consumer i . An allocation (x ,y 1, · · · ,y n) is feasible if and only if
x + l: y i :::; l: w i. An allocation (x ,y 1, · · · ,y n) is individually rational if it is feasible and if
u i (x ,y i) ;;:: u i (0 ,w i) for all i EN , and Pareto optimal if it is feasible and if there does not exist a
feasible allocation (x ,y 1, · · · ,:yn) such that u i ( x ,yi ) ;;:: u i (x ,y i) for all i EN and
uj (x,yj ) > uj (x ,yj ) for some j EN. Let
Z ={ (x,y 1, • · · ,yn) ERi : x + I: yi :::; I: wi} · ieN ieN 
Then Z is the set of all feasible allocations. It is clearly compact. 
We shall oft en denote consumer i ' s  marginal rate of substitution by 7ti (x ,y i) , that is,
7ti (x ,y i ) = (au i (x ,y i) I ax) I (CJu i (x ,y i) I a y i ) , a feasible allocation (x ,y 1, · · · ,y n)
by z, u i (x ,y i) by u i (z) and 7ti (x ,y i) by 7ti (z) whenever no confusion is possible. Clearly
7ti : R J � R +for all i EN.
Assumption 3: I: 7tj (0,wj) ;;:: 1 . 
jeN 
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The economies which do not satisfy this assumption are not of much interest. 
We shall often adopt the following notation. Let (7t1, 
· · · 
,1tn ) be some n-tuple of real 
numbers. Then 7ts = :E 7ti , S � N.
ieS 
Lemma 1: An allocation z = (x ,y 1 , · · • ,yn) is Pareto optimal if and only if 
.X + :yN = wN , 7t N ( z) = 1, and u i (x ,yi )'2:. u i (x ,y i) for all (x ,y 1, · · · ,y n )  such that 
1ti ( z) x + y i � 1ti ( z) x + Yi ' i EN.
Proof: See Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin ( 1971) . 
An allocation (x ,y 1 ,  · · · ,y  n )  is attainable by a coalition S � N if 
x +ys � ws
An allocation (x ,y 1 ,  · · · , y  n )  is a core allocation if there exists no coalition S � N and an allocation 
(x,y1 , · • · ,:yn ) attainable by S such that ui (x,yi) > ui (x ,yi ) for each i eS .
An allocation (x ,y 1 ,  · · · ,y  n )  is coalitionally noncoercive if it is feasible and if there exists 
no subset S � N such that 
X +yS <WS . 
Notice that an allocation (x ,y 1 ,  · · · ,yn ) is coalitionally noncoercive if and only if
x + yN = wN and y i � w i for all i e N. If an allocation is not coalitionally noncoercive then 
(x , y  i) >> (0 ,w i) for some i, i.e. , some consumer i has more of the public good as well as the private
good.2 
There is one more aspect of noncoercive allocations which is of interest from the point of 
view of informational decentralization. If there is privacy of information, i.e., if each consumer 
knows only about his own characteristics, then given an allocation a consumer by himself may not 
be able to figure out whether or not it is in the core. On the other hand given an allocation (and 
therefore the implicit net trade vector) , each consumer can immediately figure out whether or not it 
was a coalitionally noncoercive allocation even when there is privacy of information. 
Notice further that every core allocation is an individually rational, Pareto optimal and 
coalitionally noncoercive allocation, but every individually rational, Pareto optimal, and 
coalitionally noncoercive allocation is not necessarily a core allocation. The core is therefore 
contained in the set of all individually rational, Pareto optimal and coalitionally noncoercive 
allocations. 
2. The concept of a coalitionally noncoercive allocation was first introduced in Chander (1987b). It can also be extended to
pure exchange economies as follows. Let (wi = (wi 1 ,wi2 ) ) r=l be the initial endowments in a two-good and n-personpure exchange economy. Then an allocation (Xi =(Xi 1 .Xiz) ) r=l is coalitionally noncoercive if there exists no subset S � such that either 
:Ex; 1 < :E wn and :E X;2::; :E w;2 or :E Xn ::; :E wn and :E X;2 < :E W;2 . 
ieS ieS ieS ieS ieS ieS ieS ieS 
observe that every core allocation is a coalitionally noncoercive allocation.
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We now illustrate these solution concepts for the two consumer case by extending the Kolm 
triangle diagram. 3 In this diagram a feasible allocation z = (x ,y 1,  · · · ,y n )  is represented as a point Q 






















3. This diagram was first used by Kolm (1964) and later by Malinvaud (1971).
c 
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The vertical distance from the point Q to the horizontal side BC is taken as x : the public good
quantity , the distance from Q to the side AB as y 1 : the private good allocation of agent 1, and the 
distance from Q to the side AC as y 2 .  We know from geometry that the sum of these distances must
be equal to the vertical height of the triangle, i.e., w 1 + w 2 irrespective of the location of Q . Given
this coordinate sy stem the indifference curves of the two consumers can be represented as shown in 
Figure 1 and a Pareto optimal allocation as a point where the indifference curves of the two 
consumers are tangent to each other. 





















Let the point W on the horizontal line BC represent the initial endowment (O,w 1,w2). Then 
the points in the parallelogram WDAE represent coalitionally noncoercive allocations. The point in 
the triangles DBW and EWC represent allocations attainable by consumer 1 and 2, respectively, and 
the points P and Q their utility maximizing attainable allocations. The points enclosed between the
indifference curves uJ and uJ represent the individually rational allocations.
Let the set of points where the indifference curves of the two consumers are tangent to each 
other be represented by the curve passing through a , b , c , d, e and f . Then the points on the curve 
af represent individually rational and Pareto optimal allocations. The points on the curve be 
represent individually rational, Pareto optimal, and coalitionally noncoercive allocations. Finally the 
points on the curve cd represent the core allocations. 
On this representation we immediately see how the three solution concepts of individually 
rational and Pareto optimal allocations, individually rational, Pareto optimal and coalitionally 
noncoercive allocations, and core allocations are related to each other. 
III. THE PROCESS AND ITS CONVERGENCE
Starting att =0 withz(O)=(x(O),y1(0 ), · · · ,yn(O)) = (O,w1, · · · ,wn) ,let 
Z ( t ) = (X  ( t  ),y 1( t ) , · · · ,y n ( t  )) be the feasible allocation at time t E [0,+ oo ), then the process is
described by the following differential equation system 
where 1ti ( t  ) = 1ti (z ( t )) and 1tN ( t ) = L 1ti ( t  ). The n -tuple ((7t1( t ) I 1tN ( t  )), · · · ,ieN 
(1tn ( t ) I 1tN ( t ))) is called the cost-sharing rule.
The differential equation system (1) is of the form i = f ( z ). Since 1ti 's are continuously
differentiable functions of z , z E Z, the function f is defined on the set Z and is continuously 
differentiable. This means the function f satisfies the Lipschitz condition for uniqueness of 
solution. 
A solution to the differential equation system (1) is a continuous function, say 
h : [0,+ oo) � Z such that for every' t e [0,+ oo) the derivative dh ( t ) I dt exists and satisfies
equation system (1). The vector h ( 0 )  is the initial value of the system. 
Since the function/ is continuously differentiable the existence and uniqueness of a 
solution h : [0,+oo) � Z for the differential equation system (1) with h (0 ) = (0,w 1, • • · ,wn)
follows from standard theorems on differential equations, for example, Coddington and Levinson 
(1955). 
(1) 
It is also clear from (1) that any stationary point is a Pareto optimal allocation. The process 
is balanced at each instant t , since i ( t ) + L y i ( t ) = 0 and monotonic in terms of each u i, sinceieN . 
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where ui ( t )  = ui (x ( t )  , yi ( t  )) .
These plus the compactness of the set of feasible allocations (see Assumption 2) and the 
continuity of the utility functions u i implies that l:.u i ( t ) is a suitable Lyapunov function which
means that the process is quasi-stable in the sense that any limit point of its trajectory is a stationary 
point. The fact that at least one u i is strictly quasi-concave (Assumption 1) and that any stationary
point of (1) is a Pareto optimum implies that the process, in fact, converges to a unique stationary 
point which is Pareto optimal and at least as good as the initial endowment in terms of the utility 
functions u i , i.e., individually rational.
It is easily seen that it must also be coalitionally noncoercive. From the second equation in 
( 1) and that y i ( O) = wi , 1ti ( t ) ;;:; O for i e N , t e [0,+ oo ), and r. 1tj (0,wj);;:; 1 (Assumption 3), it
follows that x ( t ) ;;:; 0 and / ( t  ) $; 0 for all i e N and t e [0,+ 00 ), that is,
yi ( t )$;wi , ieN and te[0,+00 ). 
These properties of the process are summarized in the following lemma. 
Lemma 2: The differential equation system (1) has a unique solution h : [0,+oo) � Z which is
continuous and such that h ( 0 )  = (0,w 1, · · · ,wn ) ,i( t );;:; 0 ,./ ( t )  $; 0
and u i ( t ) ;;:; 0 ,  i e N and t e [0,+ oo )  and that the process converges to a unique stationary point
which is individually rational, Pareto optimal, and coalitionally noncoercive. 
Theorem 1 below proves that the process must in fact converge to a core allocation. This 
may first be seen intuitively from the representation in Figure 2 as follows. Since the process 
converges to a coalitionally noncoercive allocation, therefore, it cannot converge to any point 
outside the parallelogram WDAE . The process must converge thus to some point on the curve be. 
However, since / ( t )  $; 0 for i e N and t e [0,+oo), to converge to any point on the curve be the
process must first reach some point in the area enclosed between the indifference curves u ,! and u;
including the points on u ,! and u; . But if that is so then the process cannot converge to some point
- -
on the curves be and de except for the points .£ and 4. because the points on these curves except f 
and 4. correspond to utility levels lower than u ,! and u; and u i ( t ) ;;:; 0 for i e N and t e [0,+ 00 ).
Therefore, the process must converge to some point on the curve cd, i.e., to a core allocation point. 
Theorem 1: The differential equation system (1) has a unique solution and the process converges to 
a core allocation. 
Proof: Lemma 2 implies that there exists a unique solution h : [0,+oo) � Z such that the process
* * * converges to a unique point, say (x ,y  1, 
· · · ,y  n )  which is individually rational, Pareto optimal and 
coalitionally noncoercive. 
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* * Let (7t 1, · · · ,7t n) ER� be the marginal rates of substitution of the n consumers
* * * corresponding to the allocation (x ,y 1, · · · ,y n ). Then Lemma 1 implies
* . (a) 7t N = 1 ; and
(b) ui (1,yi ) � ui (x,yi )forall(x,y 1,··· ,yn) E R�+l suchthat�i x+yi ::;; �i 1+yi ,iE N. 
* * * Since (x ,y 1, ·  · ,y n) is coalitionally noncoercive,
* * * * (c) x +yN = wN and x +ys ;:::ws forallS�N. 
Suppose contrary to the assertion that there exists a coalition S and an allocation
(x ,y 1,· · · ,f: � attain�bl� ?l S !�ch that u i (x ,fi ) > u i (1,y i )  for each i E S . It follows from (b)
above that 7t 1 x + f1 > 7t1 x + y 1 for each i E S. Therefore
* * * * (d) 7t s x +ys > 7ts x +ys andx +fs ::;; ws' 
since (x,f 1, · · · ,yn) is attainable by S. It follows from (c) and (d) that
*s *s s 1t (x -x *) > y -f ;::: .x -x * .
* Since 0::;; 7ts ::;; 1 (see (a)), the above inequality can be true only if x* > x. 
*Since h : [0,+ oo) � Z is continuous, h 1 : [0,+ oo) � [0, x] is also continuous. Therefore,
there exists a t E [0,+oo) such that h 1(t) =x(t) =x. Which means for some tE [0,+00) we have(x(t),y 1(t), · · · ,yn(t)) such that
x(t) =x and x(t) + yN (t) = wN 
Lemma 2 implies thatyi (t)::;; wi for each i EN. Therefore, x(t) = x and x(t) + ys (t) � ws , i.e.,
x(t) =x and ys (t) � fs. It follows that ui (x,yi )::;; ui (x(t),yi (t)) for at least one i ES. Lemma 2
. . . * * . . . . * *. implies that ul (x (t ),yl (t )) ::;; ul (x ,y 1) for all j EN. Hence u1(x,f') > u1 (x ,y 1) is not true for at
least one i ES. This is a contradiction of our supposition. Hence the theorem.
Notice that the proof does not depend on the particular form of the second equation in ( 1) ,
but only on the fact that it leads to both y i (t) ::;; 0 and u i (t) ;::: 0 for all t E [0,+ oo ). This implies there
may exist other processes which also converge to the core. For example, the one below: 
X(t) = \ (1tL(t)-1)f -1t (t) 
·i (t) = _ l-7t (t)+ (f- l)7t (t) x(t) for iEL
[ L i ] y f-1tL(t) 
= 0 for i E N  - L , tE [0,+oo) 
( 2) 
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whereL =L(t) and f = f(t) = I  L (t) I (the cardinality of L (t)) are such that 
1 - 7tL (t) +(f - 1)7ti (t) � 0 for all iE L
and 
1 - 1tL (t) + ({ - 1) 7ti (t) < 0 for all i E N - L . 
It is easily seen that this process also has a unique continuous solution and that 
i(t) � O,yi (t) � 0 and u_i (t) � 0 for all i EN and tE [0,+oo),
It may be noted that we have proved the result only in the case of a continuous-time process. 
However, this is more a matter of convenience rather than necessity. It is possible to design a 
discrete-time version as well which converges to the core. 
Finally, note that the proof of Theorem 1 crucially depends on the fact that the public good 
is continuously substituted for the private good by all the consumers. A generalization of our result 
to pure exchange economies is therefore not straightforward. It however suggests that if one could 
somehow design a process for a pure exchange economy which is simultaneously coalitionally 
noncoercive and monotonic at each instant then it must converge to the core. 
IV. INCENTIVES AND AN IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT
The term "free rider" has not been formally defined in the public goods literature, perhaps 
because its meaning is quite clear. A consumer is a free rider if he gets to enjoy the public good 
quantity without incurring any cost. This suggests the following definition. 
A process admits downright free riding if for some economy it converges to a feasible 
allocation (x , y  1, · • • ,y n )  which is such that (x ,y i) >> (0,w i) for some consumer i E N, that is, if it
converges to an allocation which is not coalitionally noncoercive.4
From the point of view incentives, therefore, it is desirable that a process must always · 
converge to at least a coalitionally noncoercive allocation if not a core allocation. Particularly so 
because as noted earlier the allocations which are not coalitionally noncoercive can be easily
identified by the consumers even under the assumption of privacy of information. 
The core convergence property is thus an incentive property defined in terms of the payoffs 
associated with the final outcome of the process. On the other hand issues related to incentives in the 
context of dynamic processes have often been studied in the framework of what has come to be 
termed the local incentive game, see Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin (1971), Malinvaud (1971), 
Roberts (1979), Fugigaki and Sato (1981), and Laffont and Maskin (1983) among others. In this 
connection Chander (1987b) shows that though truthtelling does not constitute a dominance 
equilibrium, a unique Nash equilibrium exists for the local incentive game at each point of the 
trajectory of process ( 1) and if the agents adopt their Nash equilibrium strategies then the so-defined 
'Nash strategically stable' process is process (2) described above, which means the incentive 
4. This term was suggested to me by Professor Jacques Dreze.
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Process (3) converges to a Pareto optimal allocation only if 
F(1t(t))=O <=> rt1(t) +rt2(t)=l ,tE[O,+oo)
Notice that if F (1t(t )) = 0, then feasibility and monotonicity imply that Ti (1t(t )) = 0 ,
i = 1,2; tE ( 0 ,+oo). 
Process (3) is locally strongly incentive compatible if and only if 
T1(rt1(t),7t2(t)) 2: (rt1(t)-01)F(01,rt2(t)) + T1(01,rt2(t)) for all 01ER+,tE [0,+00 )
and only if 
_.E_ ((7t1(t)-01)F(01,rt2(t)) + T1(01,rt2(t)) I = 0 for all 01ER+ and tE [0 ,+00)ae1 101 =1t'(1) 
and similarly for consumer 2. 
Theorem 2: Suppose the functions F ('),T 10 , and T20 are such that (3) has a solution and
the process is balanced, monotonic, locally strongly incentive compatible and converges to a Pareto 
optimal allocation. Then it does not always converge from the initial endowment to a coaltionally 
noncoercive allocation and therefore core allocation. 
Let E be the class of economies in which consumer 1 has a strictly quasi-concave utility 
function and an initial endowment w 1 such that rt1(0,w 1) > 1 and consumer 2 has some utility
function of the form u 2(x ,y 2) = ex  + y 2 where 0 � e < 1 and an initial endowment w 2 > 0 .  The
individually rational, Pareto optimal, and coalitionally noncoercive allocations and core allocations 
-
-
for an economy belonging to E are shown in Figure 3 by the curves bd and cd , respectively. 
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property that the process converges to the core is not affected by myopic strategic behaviour of the 
consumers. 
We now show that there exists no process which always converges to a coaltionally 
noncoercive allocation and in which truthtelling constitutes a dominance equilibrium of the local 
incentive game. This means there are limits to what can be achieved in terms of the various 
desirable properties of dynamic processes. 
We consider only two-person processes, i.e. , N = {1,2}. Generalization to more than two 
persons is straightforward and also not necessary, since we prove only an impossibility result. 
Starting at time t = 0 with (x(O) ,y 1(0) ,y 2(0) ) = (O, w 1, w 2 ) ,  let (x (t ) ,y 1(t ) ,y 2(t ) )  be the 
feasible allocation at time t E [0 ,+ oo) , then a two-person process is defined as the following 
differential equation system. 
i(t) = F(rt(t) ) 
= -rr;i(t) F(rt(t) ) +Ti(rt(t) ) , i  =l, 2 ;tE[0,+oo) 
where rr;i (t) = 'Tti (x ,(t) ,yi (t) ) ,rt (t) = (1t1(t) ,rt2(t) ) andF(') ,T1(') and T 2(') are some arbitrary real
valued and continuously differentiable functions on R;. This means if (3) has a solution than it 
must be unique and continuous. 
Process (3) is balanced if 
2 . i (t) + :E _y' (t) = 0 , tE [0,+oo) i = 1 
Equivalently, if 
J t (n(t ) )  = [J 
1 
n'(t) - 1] F (1t(t ) )  ' IE [O,+�)
Process (3) is monotonic in terms of the utilities if 
· iJui(x(t) yi(t) ) · 
· 
· u1 (t) =  . ' (rr;1(t) i(t) +y1(t) ) � O fori =l, 2,tE[O,+oo) . iJy' (t) 
Equivalently, if 
Ti(1t(t) � 0 , i = l,2;te [0,+00) • 
(3) 
























Ase decreases the indiffere nce cmve u6 of consumer 2 rotates towards the left around point W and
the set of individually rational, Pareto optimal, and coalitionally noncoercive allocations contracts. 
For e = 0 ,  u 6 coincides with the line DW and both the sets contract to a single point P .  In such a
case any process which is monotonic and converges to the core, for example process (1), must have 
all of its trajectory on the line PW. On the other hand, any other process which does not have all of 
its trajectory on PW and is monotonic must converge to some point in the are a enclosed between the 
line DW and the curve u J excluding the points on DW, i.e., to some allocation which is not
coalitionally non-coercive. Since the functions F (') ,  T 10 , and T 2(') are continuous this must 
happen for at least sufficiently small but positive e also. 
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This intuitively explains the theorem. We shall need the following lemma for a formal 
proof. 
Lemma 3: Suppose the functions F (") ,T1(') and T2(') are such that the differential equation system 
(3) has a solution, and the process is balanced, monotonic, locally strongly incentive compatible and 
converges from the initial endowment to a Pareto optimal allocation. Then for the class of 
economics E 
1tl 
T1(1tl,e ) =f F(8, e ) d8
1-e 
and F (1t1 ,e ) is weakly increasing in 1t1 for all1t1e [l,+oo) and 0 � e < 1. 
Proof: Since (3) has a solution, it has a unique continuous solution. By assumption the process 
converges from the initial endowment to a Pareto optimal allocation for each economy in E, 
therefore, 1t1(t) must assume all values in the interval [l - E,1t1(0,w 1) ] for each 0 � e < 1 and 
1t1(0,w 1) � 1. Further, we must have 
F ( 1- e ,  e )  = 0 for all e such that 0 � e < 1. 




T1(1tl,e ) = f F(8,e )d8 +K for all 1t1e [ 1- e ,+oo) and 0�e < 1
1-e 
Since F (1 - e , e )  = 0 for all 0 � e < 1, balancedness and monotonicity imply that T1( 1- e ,  e )= 0. 
Therefore, K = 0. Hence 
1tl 
T1(1tl,e ) = f F(8,e ) d8 for all1t1e [l,+oo) andO �e <l
1-e 
On the other hand, since the process is strongly incentive compatible 
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and 
for all 1t1,1t1 + Ll(1t1) e [ 1- e,+oo) and 0::;; e < 1. Adding, we get
Ll(7t1) (F (1t1 + Ll(1t1),e ) - F (1t1 ,e ) � O for all 7t1 ,1t1 + Ll(7t1) e [ l  - e,+oo) and 0::;; e < 1 
Hence F (1t1 ,e ) is weakly increasing in 1t1 for all 7t1e [ l  - e,+ oo) and 0::;; e < 1. This completes the
lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 2: From lemma 3 and the balancedness condition, it follows that for each 
economy in E, 
1tl(t) 
= (1t1(t) - l ) F (1t1(t) ,e ) -J F(8,e )d8 for all te[O,+oo) .
1-E 
Therefore, 
. 2 { > O if 7t1(t) > 1 and e = O
Y (t) = 0 if 7t1(t) = 1 and e = O , 
t e[0,+00) . Therefore, if e = 0 and 7t1(0) > 1 then y2(t) > w2 for all te [0,+ oo ). Since the functions
F(') ,T1(' ) ,  and T20 are continuous functions, there exists an e*,O < e* < 1 such that y2(t) > w2 for
all te[O,+oo) . 
This proves that for any given utility function of consumer 1, there exists a utility function 
u2(x ,y2) = e* x + y2
of consumer 2 such that process (3) converges to an allocation which is not coalitionally 
noncoercive. This completes the proof. 
It may be noted that there does exist a process which has a unique continuous solution and 
which is balanced, monotonic, locally strongly incentive compatible, and which converges from the 
initial endowment (0,w  1,w 2) to a Pareto optimal allocation, namely
16 
See Roberts (1979) , Fugigaki and Sato (1981) , and Laffont and Mask.in (1983) . 
Finally, note that the requirement that 7t1(0,w 1) > 1 is not essential for the above result to
obtain if there are more than two consumers. 
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